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Shifting trends in higher education funding 









The  global increase  in the  demand  for  tertiary  education, with  higher  education  systems 
expanding in many countries from elite systems to universal access, necessitated changes 
to the nature of higher education financing. Tuition fees, or other charges (where it was 
previously free) were introduced, substantial increases in tuition fees (where fees previously 
did exist) took place and student aid systems moved away from grants towards student 
loans  (to  replace  or  supplement  grants).  The  controversy  and  debate  surrounding  these 
issues were influenced by politics, legal issues, social policy issues and economic reasoning. 
The paper firstly considers the shift in higher education financing since the 1960s in light of 
the focus of economic thinking in the 1960s and 1970s (the human capital model, growth 
accounting,  views  on  elite  versus  mass  systems,  the  private/public  nature  of  higher 
education and rates of return) compared to the more recent focus on primary education, 
private  and  social  rates  of  return  and  cost  sharing.  The  global  typology  of  allocation 
mechanisms is then examined. Although a myriad of allocation systems is operational, a 
definite shifting trend from direct to indirect funding (to support students) of institutions can 
be identified. 
The paper subsequently explores the global workings, conditions and problems of income-
contingent student loans (ICL) and then focuses on the South African trend in direct funding 
(including the current subsidy formula for higher education) and student support systems. 
The South African allocation system exhibits the global trend towards indirect funding and 
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Shifting trends in higher education funding 
 
Introduction 
The increasing trend in global demand for higher education is evident when official world student 
numbers are considered. Due to (among other things) globalisation and countries‟ integration into 
the modern knowledge economy as well as an increasing awareness of the private returns to higher 
education,  student  enrolment  has  expanded  dramatically  since  2000  –  especially  in  developing 
countries. The Global Education Digest (Unesco, 2009: 9) reports an increase in higher education 
student numbers worldwide of 51.7 million for the period 2000 (100.8 million) to 2007 (152.5 
million). Enrolment figures for higher education “has skyrocketed over the past 37 years, growing 
five-fold from 28.6 million in 1970 to 152.5 million in 2007. This translates into an average annual 
increase of 4.6%, with the average number of tertiary students doubling every 15 years.” (Unesco, 
2009: 10).  
The highest growth rate in higher education enrolment was recorded in sub-Saharan Africa where 
student  numbers  increased  by  10%  annually  between  2000  and  2005  (Unesco,  2009:  10).  In 
comparison to other regions however, the total number of sub-Saharan African higher education 
students still lags behind and accounts for only 3% of global enrolment although 11.9% of the 
world population lives in this area (Population Reference Bureau, 2008). East Asia and the Pacific 
now lead the score board in terms of numbers with 46,7 million students in 2007 (31% of global 
enrolment) followed by Central and Eastern Europe (at 23% of global enrolment), Central and 
Eastern Europe (14% of global enrolment) and Latin America and the Caribbean and Arab States 
(both with global enrolment shares of 12%). (Unesco, 2009: 9–13) 
Growing participation at higher education implies that the season is definitely changing for higher 
education systems globally as they are expanding to accommodate the rapidly increasing demand 
for higher education. There is a definite shift in higher education systems away from elite systems 
(systems where less than 15% of the relevant age cohort is enrolled) towards mass systems (15–
50%  enrolment)  and  in  some  countries  even  universal  systems  (with  more  than  50%  access), 
following  Trow‟s  (1974)  terminology.  This  puts  tremendous  strain  on  already  stretched  higher 
education systems given the fact that some regions‟ systems are incapable of accommodating higher 
growth rates (e.g. that of sub-Saharan Africa). Unesco (2009:10) identifies the sub-Saharan higher 
education  systemic  crisis  when  stating  that  the  “[c]hanging  levels  of  participation  in  tertiary  
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education require a significant  amount of additional  funding. Moreover, education planners are 
already faced with the challenge of recruiting qualified academic staff for systems that are doubling 
in size every eight years on average.” This rapid increase from the demand side leads, in most 
higher education systems, to fundamental changes in the funding of higher education. 
In the first section of the paper we explore the dual nature of higher education – i.e. the public and 
private characteristics – by briefly stating the relevant theories and then discuss the profitability of 
investment (rates of return) in education. In the second section we explore the international practice 
regarding public and private funding of higher education, discuss the rationale for levying private 
fees  and  examine  the  types  of  institutions  and  modes  of  financing  (both  for  students  and 
institutions). The paper concludes by discussing South Africa‟s New Financial Framework (NFF) 
system in light of the current global higher education financing trends. 
Public financing of education 
Globally, public expenditure on education increased quite substantially during the latter half of the 
previous century. By 1986 on average 11.6% of total government spending, equal to 5.4% of GDP, 
was  channelled  to  education  in  OECD  countries  (de  Villiers,  1996:  214–215).  In  1998  the 
corresponding figures were 12.9% and 4.6% respectively (OECD, 2004: Table B2 & B4). In 2006 
OECD countries spent on average 5.7% of GDP on education (OECD, 2009: Table B2.1). These 
high levels of spending on education can be linked to the development of the human capital model, 
formulated in the 1960s. Theodor Shultz, Edward Denison and Gary Becker did pioneering work in 
this regard
1. According to the human capital model, people gain productivity by further training and 
the market then subsequently remunerates these skilled workers better. This resulted in the belief 
that greater investment in human capital will lead to higher economic growth rates and that the rates 
of return on these investments for both government and private individuals are very profitable. With 
growth  accounting,  human capital  also  turned  out  to  be  an  importa nt  variable in  explaining 
economic growth. The message from these studies was very simple  –  invest  in  education  if 
improved worker productivity and enhanced economic growth are desired. Demographic forces also 
led to a vast increase in the demand for higher education in the latter half of the previous century. 
This stimulated investment in education at all levels of education. The latter half of the previous 
century was also the period where countries started to move away from treating higher education as 
                                                 
1 See for example Rosen (1987) and Cohn and Geske (1990) for a good overview of these developments.  
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an  elite  system  (where  less  than  15  per  cent  of  the  relevant  age  group  is  enrolled  in  higher 
education) towards transforming the system into what can be called mass education (where higher 
education  enrolment  is  more  than  50  per  cent).  In  this  transformation  process  the  Robbins 
Committee‟s (1963) investigation of higher education funding in the UK played an influential role 
(Woodhall, 2007: 9–11). In this report frequent references to economic concepts and human capital 
occurred for the first time. The report recommended a substantial increase in public expenditure on 
higher education. They also looked at financing higher education through tuition fees and student 
loans. In the end they rejected repayable student loans because they feared that British parents will 
not let their daughters enrol for higher education. In a sense they were afraid that the risk aversion 
behaviour of parents will prevent enough female students from going to university or college. 
Ten years later (1973) the report of the Carnegie Commission on higher education in the USA was 
published (Woodhall, 2007: 12–13). They felt strongly about equal access for everybody to higher 
education. To achieve this they realised that some of the direct costs of higher education should be 
shifted from the family of low-income students to the taxpayer. In the longer run they expected 
family income to increase and as more students attend higher education, more of the costs should be 
borne by the students themselves. In the end their proposal of higher subsidies to higher education 
was based on equity and not so much influenced by the magnitude of social benefits. Interestingly, 
although  both  commissions  considered  cost  sharing,  neither  of  them  proposed  that  it  be 
implemented. 
Private and public nature of higher education 
The controversy as to what extent the government must pay for higher education has its roots in the 
uncertainty about the public/private nature of higher education. Private goods are both rival (for 
example,  if  someone  drinks  a  cool  drink  there  will  be  less  available  to  other  consumers)  and 
excludable  (if  I  do  not  pay  for  a  cool  drink  I  cannot  consume  it).  With  public  goods,  like 
streetlights, the situation is totally different. If one person walks underneath a lamppost it does not 
diminish the amount of light left for other consumers and they can make use of the light irrespective 
of whether they paid their taxes. Once a public good is produced nobody can be prevented from 
consuming the good, giving rise to the problem of free riders. The question to answer is to what 
extend is higher education a private or public good?  
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Cemmell (2003) distinguishes four functions of higher education, namely training of highly skilled 
personnel, development of new knowledge and research, contribution to community service and an 
ethical  function,  that  may  include  social  critique.  Knowledge  that  one  student  acquires  in  the 
education process does not mean that there is less knowledge available for the other students. In the 
training of students the contact that one student makes with a lecturer (during lectures) does not 
decrease the time available for the other students. In this sense higher education may be regarded as 
a public good. However, it is also true that the more individual time (for example during consulting 
hours) one student requires from a lecturer the less time is available for other students. Also, if 
educational institutions reserve the number of seats available to new students, the acceptance of one 
student  implies  that  fewer  places  are  available  to  other  potential  students.  Higher  education 
therefore displays certain characteristics of private goods as well. Certain groups can for instance be 
prevented from entering higher education by levying high fees. This is a practice that has been used 
since the earliest of years to prevent prospective students from poorer communities (considered to 
be of a lower social status) to enter higher education. 
Since higher education also exhibits characteristics of private goods, the question can be posed to 
what  extent  public  funding  is  defendable.  Melck  (1982:  105)  mentions  three  reasons  why  the 
government  should  be  involved  in  education,  namely  risk  taking,  uncertainty  and  insufficient 
liquidity. Young people are uncertain about the benefits that they will reap from further education 
and  they  sometimes  come  from  families  that  do  not  value  education  or  do  not  receive  proper 
guidance in this regard.  If a student enrols in the wrong programme it might be a  very costly 
mistake. Due to the long term nature of an investment in education, people from poor communities 
may be reluctant to take the risk of higher education if it is not subsidised by the public sector. 
Fundamental research and research results (Cemmell‟s second function) forms the basis for future 
and applied studies.  If the government  makes  no contribution  to  this  research, it might  not  be 
undertaken at all. The results of the research are published in research journals and become public 
assets. A strong case can thus be made for public financing of such research. At higher education 
institutions research is also initiated by the private sector contracting institutional experts to become 
involved in specific research projects. Cemmell (2003) views this as part of the community function 
of universities and in this process the researchers face very few risks. Some researchers even have 
to sign confidentiality clauses and in the short run private institutions can thus keep these research 
results a secret. However, knowledge built on research of the past and the course content of higher  
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education are a function of previous research. If basic research is not properly funded the rate at 
which  core  research  is  undertaken  will  slow  because  more  research  will  focus  on  profitable 
activities. In this context Cemmell (2004) sees education in the long run as a public good. 
As far as the social-ethical function of education is concerned, Cemmell (2004) is of the opinion 
that it is not an excludable product. As long as people‟s human rights are not violated in the process 
of criticism, it cannot be seen as a public good. There are numerous studies that focus on the 
indirect benefits of education, like better communication, more responsible behaviour, law abiding 
behaviour,  the  involvement  in  and  understanding  of  the  democratic  process  and  contributing 
towards the intellectual and cultural well-being of the community. These indirect benefits are not 
excludable and are passed on from one person to another. In this light higher education can be 
regarded as a public good. Higher education can also be regarded as a merit good that justifies 
involvement of the state in the education system because the community benefits from it. 
The indirect benefits of educations have not been quantified with any great deal of accuracy. As 
Melck (1982: 103–105) rightly points out the positive externalities of education may result in the 
undersupply and overpricing of education if the provision of education is entirely left to market 
forces. In this respect the payment of state subsidies are justified to correct for market failures. 
Melck (1982: 19) states clearly that up to the 1980s no study has been done that categorically 
determined the magnitude of private and public benefits of education. Not much new light has since 
his dissertation been shed on this problem of quantifying the benefits of education. On the one hand 
it is very difficult to quantify the benefits of education, but it is also very difficult (and some would 
argue impossible) to distinguish between private and public benefits on the other. 
Profitability of investment in education 
One method that can be used to calculate the profitability of an investment in education is cost 
benefit analysis. With this method the cumulative costs and benefits are discounted to their present 
value and if the present value of the benefits is greater than the present value of the costs it is 
desirable to undertake a project. Another method, and one more generally used in education, is to 
calculate the interest rate that will equate the discounted values of the benefits and costs. This is 
also known as the internal rate of return. With this type of analysis one must clearly distinguish 
between the private and public nature of the costs and benefits of education, because a distinction is 
made between the private and social calculation (for a detailed discussion of the difference between  
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private and public benefits and costs of education as well as the direct and indirect components 
thereof, see for example de Villiers, 1984: 51–56 and 74–85). Although in theory we can fairly 
easily distinguish between the private and public components, it is very difficult to quantify all 
these items. Therefore the results of these studies must be treated cautiously. 
Worldwide  several  studies  have  been  done  to  calculate  the  rates  of  return  of  investment  in 
education. Psacharoupoulos and Patrinos (2004) give a good summary of the results of studies done 
in 98 countries over the period 1960-1999 that have been conducted on a comparable basis. These 
results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Rate of return of investment in education 
Region  Social  Private 
Primary  Secondary  Higher  Primary  Secondary  Higher 
Asia  16.2  11.1  11.0  20.0  15.8  18.2 
Europe/Middle 
East/North Africa 
15.6  9.7  9.9  13.8  13.6  18.8 
Latin America  17.4  12.9  12.3  26.6  17.0  19.5 
OCED  8.5  9.4  8.5  13.4  11.3  11.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  25.4  18.4  11.3  37.6  24.6  27.8 
World  18.9  13.1  10.8  26.6  17.0  19.0 
Source: Psacharoupoulos & Patrinos (2004: 114) 
Clear trends follow from Table 1. Firstly, the private rate of return is higher than the social rate of 
return for all areas and all levels of education. On average for the world the private rate of return for 
primary  education  is  7.7  percentage  points  higher  than  the  social  rate  of  return  and  the 
corresponding figure for secondary schooling is 3.9 percentage points. On average the private rate 
of return for higher education is no less than 8.2 percentage points higher than the social rate of 
return. This gives the impression that there is scope for individuals to contribute more towards the 
costs of their higher education. However, one has to remember that the table includes countries 
where higher education was almost fully subsidised, which increases the private rates of return to 
artificially high levels, because the individuals‟ contribution to their own education is very small. 
The private rates of return is higher than the social rates of return for all educational levels, but the 
rates  normally  decrease  as  the  level  of  education  increases.  The  rates  of  return  in  developing  
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countries are normally higher for all levels of education than the rates in developed countries. When 
one looks at the sub-Saharan Africa region (which South Africa forms part of) it is clear that these 
rates of return are the highest of all regions in the world for all levels of education. Especially the 
private rate of return on higher education is very high. 
The high private rates of return is a good argument to increase the private fees of education. The 
implication of these high rates is that private fees can be increased without the fear that it will 
become unprofitable for individuals to invest in their own education. The fairly high social rates of 
return indicate that investment in education is a profitable investment for the state. There is growing 
evidence that the social rates of return have been underestimated (see for example Keswell and 
Poswell, 2005) that will strengthen the argument to increase public spending on higher education. 
Here it is important to draw a distinction between different fields of study, because there are not 
uniform rates of return for all higher education programmes. Studies quoted by Psacharoupoulos 
(1994: 1329–1331) indicate that the rates of return in different fields of study differ substantially. 
This is confirmed in a study quoted in the Economist (2003) of British learners. These rates indicate 
that there is a case to be made in favour of the introduction of differentiated tuition fees for different 
fields of study and that certain fields of study may be financed to a larger extent by the students 
themselves. 
According to Melck (1982: 114–115) there are advantages on both the demand and supply sides of 
the education market to levy private fees. From an administrative point it is more efficient, but it 
also fulfils the same role as the levying of a direct tax. With different fees between higher education 
institutions the students themselves can decide about possible rates of return. With public provision 
it is frequently found that no institution excels, but that all institutions tend to be average. Efficiency 
on the supply  side can  be increased  by  greater competition  and in  such conditions  institutions 
normally adapt more easily to a changing environment and they tend to accommodate a wide range 
of students to a larger extent. 
Cost-sharing 
The belief in some circles that higher education is a basic right assumes that education is a public 
good. This, linked with article 29 of the Constitution of South Africa, can create the belief that 
education in South Africa should be primarily publicly financed. With the most recent changes in 
policy by institutions like the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and individual countries  
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like  the  United  Kingdom  that  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  individual  should  make  a  greater 
contribution towards the costs of higher education, it becomes clear that higher education cannot be 
seen as a pure public good. The higher return to money invested in primary education relative to 
higher education makes it more profitable for countries to invest more in primary education. In the 
1990s this was also accompanied by lower donor funding for higher education. This led to more 
countries  introducing  or  increasing  tuition  fees  (Woodhall,  2008:  20).  It  seems  as  though 
individuals will in future contribute to a greater extent towards their own higher educational costs. 
It is important to remember that the finances for higher education originate from only four sources. 
With  direct  subsidies  to  higher  education  institutions  it  is  the  taxpayers  that  finance  higher 
education.  With  cost-sharing  the  other  parties  involved  must  contribute  as  well.  This  includes 
students that have to pay higher tuition fees or the parents of students that financially support their 
children. In the last instance higher education institutions also receive philanthropic funding (the so 
called third income stream). If government contributions to higher education decrease it means that 
the shortfall must be financed by one of the last mentioned three sources. 
Although  it  is  experienced  worldwide  that  cost-sharing  is  used  more  generally  one  has  to  be 
cautious when introducing such a system. The popularity of higher education, linked with limited 
public funding for higher education, means that cost-sharing will stay a hotly debated topic by 
politicians and policy analysts alike (Johnson, 2004: 410). If cost-sharing is accepted as the way 
forward it is important that mechanisms are put in place that will make it possible for students from 
poor communities still to be able to afford higher education (Barr 2004). 
Although cost-sharing is no longer optional for most higher education systems, the ways in which 
cost-sharing  are  implemented  vary  greatly.  Cost-sharing,  in  different  versions,  is  generally 
increasing throughout the world. Cost-sharing has lead to heated policy debates in the past few 
decades  and  although  “cost-sharing  may  be  better  viewed  as  a  concept  and  a  general  policy 
direction than a specific policy prescription or agenda” (Johnstone, 2004: 410), it has often been 
(mis)used.  Johnstone  (2004:  410)  emphasises  the  importance  of  cost-sharing  as  a  goal  and 
contextualises  its  controversy  when  he  asserts  that  “the  extraordinary  need  for,  and  general 
popularity of, higher education, plus the apparent limitation of public revenues and the ever fierce 
competition for these scarce public revenues means that the goal of cost-sharing will continue to 
intrigue politicians and policy analysts, even in the face of inevitable political opposition.”  
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Allocation mechanisms in higher education financing 
The realities of moving towards cost-sharing in higher education systems include the important 
question of general access. As higher education institutions become more dependent on tuition fees 
than on government funds, needy students might be crowded out on financial grounds, exacerbating 
equity issues. Implementing cost-sharing necessitates strategic thinking on providing for students 
from poor backgrounds (Woodhall 2007: 27; Johnstone 2009: 15). 
The  International  Comparative  Higher  Education  and  Accessibility  Project  (ICHEFAP,  2009) 
documents the practise of cost-sharing (and the provision of financial assistance) in 47 countries. 
Higher education typically consists of a combination of private and public institutions. In each 
country the relative combination between private and public institutions differs. It is a world-wide 
phenomenon  that  the  relative  contribution  of  the  public  sector  towards  higher  education  is 
decreasing. For example, the so-called „rijksbijdrae‟ in the Netherlands decreased from 84.4% of 
total income in 1985 to 69% in 2001 (Jongbloed & Salerno, 2003: 32). Individuals‟ contributions 
are increasingly expected to cover the cost of their own education to a greater extent. This tendency 
is in line with the world-wide high private rate of return on higher education. Due to the relative 
decrease in public funds, higher education institutions themselves need to generate more income to 
decrease the deficits.  
In almost all countries public financing schemes exist to enable students from poor communities to 
afford higher education. This support ranges from bursaries or scholarships to loans with different 
repayment or interest rate criteria. In these systems, a definite trend is noticeable towards innovative 
allocation  mechanisms  that  allow  both  public  and  private  funds  to  go  further  in  meeting  the 
challenges that higher education systems face around the world. It is further evident that as the 
before  mentioned  concepts  (e.g.  cost-sharing,  private  returns)  became  increasingly  popular  in 
general,  higher  education  systems  started  to  implement  these  concepts  in  the  design  and 
implementation of their financing structures and mechanisms. 
 
 




Global typology of allocation mechanisms 
I.  Direct Public Funding of Institutions  II   Support of Students/Indirect Funding 
of Institutions 
1.  Funding instruction, operations and 
investments 
1.  ‘Demand side’ vouchers 
1.1 Negotiated or ad hoc budgets  2.  Government grants & scholarships 
1.2 Categorical or earmarked funds  2.1 Program administration 
1.3 Funding formulas  2.2 Eligibility and coverage 
1.4 Performance-based funding   
  3.  Tax benefits 
2.  Funding of research  3.1 Current tuition fees 
2.1 Instruction and research funded together  3.2 Family allowances 
2.2 Research project funding   
2.3 Block grant funding for research  4. Student loan models 
  4.1 Repay plans 
  4.2 Sources of funds 
  4.3 Expenses covered 
  4.4 Eligible to borrow 
  4.5 Level of subsidy 
   
  5. Part grant /part loan 
  5.1 Loans that become grants 
  5.2 Loan forgiveness 
Source:  Salmi & Hauptman (2006: 84–91) 
The common funding possibilities and practises in global higher education systems can generally be 
divided into two broad categories: those mechanisms that mainly rely on direct public funding of 
institutions and those where a growing share of public funds are earmarked for the support of 
students or so-called indirect funding of institutions (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). In an extensive 
comparative evaluation of global higher education allocation mechanisms, Salmi and Hauptman (op 
cit) survey innovations in higher education funding. Table 2 summarises the broad global typology 
of higher education allocation mechanisms. 
Governments in most countries provide a large share of public funding directly to institutions to 
support their financing of instruction, recurrent expenses, capital investment and university-based 
research. The traditional way of allocating funds for instruction, operations and investment typically 
followed variations of three mechanisms: negotiated or ad hoc budgets where negotiations between 
government and the institution determined the level of funding and the funds distributed to the 
institution either as line-item budgets (with rigid restrictions on what the money can be spent on) or 
a single block grant (giving the institution more spending autonomy); categorical or earmarked  
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funds where the funds  are typically provided for a specific purpose or allocated to  a group of 
institutions perceived to have previously been under-funded (South Africa used to earmark funds 
for predominantly black institutions before the mergers of institutions took place); and funding 
formulas (first column, table 2). Funding formulas (developed by political entities or buffer bodies) 
are typically used to allocate funds for the recurrent expenses of institutions and include a variety of 
factors  (like  inputs  such  as  staff  or  students,  costs  per  student,  priority  based  funding  and 
performance-based formula components) in order to determine the specific formula (South Africa‟s 
New  Funding  Formula  (NFF)  is  an  example).  Performance-based  funding  is  a  non-traditional 
funding  mechanism  that  has  been  adopted  by  a  number  of  countries  in  recent  years  to  fund 
operating budgets (partially or completely) or capital investment. Four performance-based funding 
types  are distinguished  – performance set asides, performance contracts, competitive funds and 
payment for results (Salmi & Hauptman, 2006: 8–23). 
Funds to support university-based research are traditionally allocated by funding instruction and 
research  together  or  through  research  project  funding  (where  proposed  projects  of  faculty  are 
funded). A less traditional way of allocating funds for research is by a block grant allocation that is 
generally not project specific and where the size of the block grant may be based on the institutional 
demonstrated capacity or centres of research excellence. (A further mechanism is though demand 
side funding of research but that is more indirect in nature.) (Salmi & Hauptman, 2006: 23–27) 
As the goal of cost-sharing gains popularity, countries provide public funds not only directly to 
institutions but a growing share of these funds indirectly to students and their families. These funds 
are allocated in the form of grants and scholarships, tax benefits and a myriad of student loans. 
Using „demand side‟ vouchers is one way of allocating the funds to the user, but is not equally 
common for higher education as for primary education (table 2, column II). In most countries, 
students  receive  non-repayable  aid  which  is  provided  through  a  combination  of  how  the  aid 
program administration takes place (typically by institutions or through student aid vouchers) and 
eligibility is determined, and coverage established. Financial need is in most countries the primary 
factor (through means-testing) to establish the students‟ eligibility for grants, and academic merit 
the factor for merit-based scholarships with some countries (like the Czech Republic, France, Malta 
and  Slovakia)  using  both  financial  need  and  the  academic  merit  of  the  student  to  establish 
eligibility. Some countries support students through granting tax benefits. Generally by allowing  
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students and/or families to offset current tuition fees or through family allowances, governments 
help parents to offset the expenses of children while they study. (Salmi & Hauptman, 2006: 28–33) 
In more than 75 countries around the world [Shen & Zideman (2007) quoted by Johnstone (2009: 
1)] the most popular way governments support students is through student loan models (table 2, 
column II). A variety of student loan models exists that can be defined firstly according to the type 
of repayment schedule that the policy makers developing the student loan plan decide on, secondly 
according to the sources of the funds i.e. how the loans are financed, thirdly according to the type of 
expenses (exclusively either tuition or living expenses or both) covered, fourthly in terms of the 
eligibility of students for the loans and finally according to the level of subsidy provided (high level 
if the subsidy is at a value of more than 10% and low level if it is less than 10% of the face value of 
the amount borrowed). Two forms of student loan repayment plans are typically distinguished: The 
mortgage-type (or fixed-schedule, or conventional) loan and the income contingent  loan (ICL). 
(Graduate tax and human capital contracts are other repayment options that are not really in use.) 
Under ICL, loans can either be repaid in a system of mandatory income contingent repayment 
where “the borrowers repay based on their income after graduation and the amount borrowed” 
(Salmi  &  Hauptman,  2006:  89)  (with  fees  initially  paid  either  by  students  and  families  or 
government)  or  in  an  optional  income  contingent  repayment  system  where  borrowers  with 
amortised obligations have the option to repay on the basis of their after graduation income (Salmi 
& Hauptman, 2006: 33–43). 
One further arrangement of providing student aid (part loan/part grant) is when a portion of the aid 
is in the form of a loan and a portion as a grant/scholarship or when a part of what the borrower 
owes, is waived (or forgiven) if the graduate accepts a certain type of employment (e.g. teachers or 
doctors that agree to work in rural areas for an extended period of time). (Salmi & Hauptman, 2006: 
43–44) 
Although  a  myriad  of  allocation  mechanisms  are  operational  in  the  financing  (and  allocation 
thereof) in higher education, a definite trend is distinguishable. There has been a shift from direct 
public funding towards a more indirect funding of institutions (support of students). Because of the 
access and equity issues that higher education systems face, student loan models have become 
increasingly important. ICL (as one of the student loan models) is gaining popularity in developed  
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and  developing  countries  alike  (e.g.  Australia,  Scotland,  Thailand,  UK,  Sweden,  Chile,  New 
Zealand and South Africa). 
ICL explained 
An ICL is a loan that is repayable as a fixed proportion of a graduate‟s income (as mentioned 
above). According to Chapman (2005: 1) “[t]he critical and defining characteristic of an ICL is that 
the collection of the debt depends on the borrowers‟ future levels of income. Capacity to pay, and 
not time, defines the repayment obligation”. 
The success of an ICL system depends on the efficient administration thereof and has the chance of 
being successful only if at least two conditions are met.  “[A]n income-contingent loan approach 
requires that a government is able to do at least two things efficiently. First, students‟ incomes need 
to be recorded accurately over time … Second, there has to be an efficient collection system … if 
there  are  simple  ways  for  former  students  to  avoid  repayment  obligations,  income-contingent 
approaches will not work …” (Chapman & Ryan 2002: 79 in Woodhall 2007: 34) 
It is mainly when these two conditions are not met that the problems with ICL surface. When the 
government agencies that deal with these loans are inefficient in administration and coordination in 
the system is lacking, higher risks (especially in non repayment of loans) result. In Australia for 
instance,  HECS  (Higher  Education  Contribution  Scheme)  graduates  were  more  prone  to  avoid 
paying  tax  than  any  other  citizen.  Johnstone  (2009:  11-12)  cautions  that  although  politically 
popular, an ICL system is not necessarily financially suitable for all countries. 
The financing of the South African higher education system 
Public  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  is  frequently  used  to  compare  spending  patterns  of 
different countries. In 2007 an average of 0.83% of GDP was spent on higher education in 102 
countries (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2004: simple average calculated from Table 14). For 30 
OECD countries public spending on higher education in 2006 amounted to 1.4% of GDP (OECD, 
2009: 218). Although studies indicate that it is profitable for the state to invest in education, public 
funding of higher education in South Africa decreased over time. While 0.86% of GDP was spent 
on higher education in 1987 it decreased to only 0.59% of GDP in 2007 (De Villiers and Steyn, 
2007: 140). South African expenditure on higher education thus lags behind what is paid in the rest 





Public expenditure on higher education in South Africa: 1987-2009 
 
 
Figure 1 gives a clear indication what happened to public expenditure on higher education over the 
last two decades. The left axis measures the percentage of higher expenditure as a percentage of 
total  expenditure  by  the  state  and  as  a  percentage  of  educational  expenditure.  The  right  axis 
measures higher education expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In 1987 3.03% of total expenditure 
by the state was spent on higher education. This percentage increased slightly to 3.05% in 1999, but 
since then decreased steadily to 2.29% in 2009. As a percentage of educational expenditure the 
proportion of higher educational expenditure dropped from 15.43% in 1987 to 14.03% in 1999 and 
thereafter decreased even further to 11.51% in 2009. According to possible future funding scenarios 
of higher education by de Villiers and Steyn (2007), the chances are very slim indeed that the higher 
education sector in South Africa will receive much (if any) financial relief in the foreseeable future. 
The increase in public expenditure on higher education as percentage of GDP for 2008 and 2009 
can largely be attributed to earmarked allocations to institutions to improve infrastructure and to 




The decreasing role of the state can also be seen in the state appropriations to higher education 
institutions in South Africa. In 1987 state appropriation was 53% of the income of universities and 
68% of the income of technikons. In 2003 these percentage decreased to 41% and 52% respectively 
(Steyn and de Villiers 2006). In real terms state appropriations per weighted full time equivalent 
student at university decreased by 36% from R25 125 in 1986 to R16 199 in 2003. At technikons 
there was a real decrease of 43% from R22 121 in 1987 to R12 515 in 2003. Higher education 
institutions reacted to this by increasing tuition fees. The result was that tuition fees increased from 
13% of the income of universities in 1987 to 23% in 2003. At technikons this percentage increased 
from 12% to no less that 30%. In real terms tuition fees at universities increased by 49% from      
R6 068 in 1986 to R9 030 in 2003. At technikons the increase was 85% in real terms from R3 812 
in 1987 to R7 056 in 2003. 
 
The result of this increase in tuition fees was that students found it more difficult to afford higher 
education. Student debt at higher education institutions more than doubled between 2001 and 2003 
and  student  debt  written  off  doubled  between  2000  and  2003.  This  happened  despite  the 
introduction of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) in 1995 to help needy students 
to afford higher education. The scheme started with a mere R40 million in 1995 and was extended 
to R333 million the next year to 73 140 students. In 2007 R1.7 billion was allocated to NSFAS and 
140 901 awards were granted (NSFAS 2008: 10). In 2008 this amount increased substantially to 
R2.1 billion. Without the financial assistance of the NSFAS the debt situation of students would 
have been much worse. In 2008 93% of the receivers of NSFAS awards were African, 4% was 
white,  2%  coloured  and  1%  Indian.  Recovered  funds  also  increased  dramatically  from  a  mere     
R30 million in 1998/99 to R479 million in 2007/08. 
 
Current financing formula for higher education in South Africa 
The New Funding Formula (NFF) was implemented in 2004. With the previous SAPSE formula the 
size of subsidy payments were roughly determined on a 50:50 weighting between input and output 
variables. With the current system the state has more control about who receives the subsidies and it 
is to a larger extent driven by input factors (De Villiers and Steyn, 2008: 45-47). In 2006 87% of the 
allocations were determined by the subsidy formula, while the remaining 13% were earmarked 
allocations for NSFAS, foundation payments, restructuring, etc. The subsidy consists of 4 block  
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grants, namely a teaching input block grant, a teaching output block grant, a research output block 
grant and a block grant for other institutional factors. 
 
The input block grant is based on full-time equivalent student numbers per funding group (human 
sciences and natural sciences) and study levels (undergraduate, honours, etc.). In 2006 65% of the 
direct subsidy was paid through this grant. The teaching output block grant (15% of direct funds in 
2006) is based on qualifications awarded, but also a payment to underperforming institutions (which 
then is actually an input grant). The research output block grant (13% in 2006) is determined by 
research output (publications in accredited journals, research masters degrees, doctoral degrees) as 
well as a grant paid to underperforming institutions (which again is an input grant). The remaining 
7% of the subsidy was paid to certain higher education institutions based on institutional factors like 
the  size  of  the  institution  (large  institutions  enjoy  economies  of  scale)  and  the  number  of 
disadvantaged students at the institution. While half of the previous subsidy was based on outputs, 
only about 26% of the current subsidy is based on outputs. 
 
Conclusion 
Student enrolment numbers in higher education has been increasing over the past five decades. 
Against this demand-side expansion, most governments did initially provide public funding in order 
for  the  higher  education  institutions  to  supply  sufficient  education.  The  debate  regarding  who 
should fund higher education (the public or private sector) continues partly due to the inability to 
precisely  quantify  the  private  versus  public  rates  of  returns  to  higher  education.  Although 
government  appointed commissions  of inquiry  in the UK  and USA  into the funding of higher 
education (e.g. Robbins and Carnegie) considered the merits of cost-sharing, it was only at the turn 
of  the  20
th  century  with  the  massification  of  higher  education  that  cost-sharing  was  seriously 
reconsidered. With the World Bank‟s emphasis on the importance of primary education and the 
general emphasis on the high rates of returns on primary education, government as well as donor 
funding moved away from higher education to primary education. Cost-sharing can be justified by 
the high private rate of return to higher education although a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggests that the social benefit of higher education is probably underestimated. 
 
The re-allocation of public funding (that has been decreasing) towards supporting students instead 
of higher education institutions directly, put more financial responsibility on the other three private  
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sources  (i.e.  students,  parents  and  donors)  that  manifested  in  the  changing  nature  of  higher 
education  allocation  mechanisms.  This  global  cost-sharing  trend  necessitated  the  support  of 
especially students from poor backgrounds, currently mainly through the ICL systems. South Africa 
is no exception to this trend as is evident from its current public financing system through the NFF 
where government provides support to students through the NSFAS. 
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